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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 At Durrell Smith’s trial for threatening federal officers 
with a gun, the Government sought to establish that two years 
earlier Smith had been observed dealing drugs at the same 
location as the charged assault.  Smith objected, arguing that 
the relevance of the drug deal to the gun crime requires an 
inference that because Smith was a drug dealer in the past he 
must have been a drug dealer on the day in question.  The 
District Court overruled Smith’s objection and permitted 
evidence about the earlier drug sale.  Smith was convicted 
and sentenced to 30 years in prison.   
 
 We conclude that the evidence of Smith’s drug 
distribution, two years before the incident for which he was 
3 
on trial, violates our long-standing requirement that, when 
seeking to introduce evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 
404(b), the proponent must set forth “a chain of logical 
inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because 
the defendant committed . . . offenses before, he therefore is 
more likely to have committed this one.”  United States v. 
Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  
We therefore reverse the District Court’s evidentiary ruling, 
vacate Smith’s conviction as to Counts 1 and 2 of the 
Indictment, and remand for a new trial. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
A. The September 2010 Incident  
 
On September 1, 2010, FBI Agent Michael Alerassool 
and three other officers were conducting surveillance in an 
unmarked car with tinted windows on the corner of 
Brunswick and Parkhurst Streets, as part of an ongoing drug 
activity investigation in Newark.  Most people in the vicinity 
scattered when the vehicle arrived on the street, but 
Alerassool observed Appellant Durrell Smith through the car 
window, standing his ground across the street and staring into 
the vehicle. 
 
 Smith then disappeared from Alerassool’s sight but 
returned about one minute later, walking at a regular pace 
towards the car.  As Smith passed under a street lamp, 
Alerassool noticed that he had a handgun in his right hand, 
“pointing [the gun] kind of at a downward angle,” about 
seven inches from his right thigh.  App. 115.  Smith then 
began to rotate his shoulder to face the officers as he 
approached the vehicle.  Alerassool called out to the others in 
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the car that Smith had a gun, and Smith was arrested before 
he could get any closer.  The officers recovered a CF-380 
semi-automatic handgun from Smith’s person but there is no 
contention that drugs were found on Smith on that day. 
 
 The next day, Smith was interviewed by Newark 
Police Detective Raul Diaz.  Smith waived his Miranda rights 
and confessed that he had been on the corner of Brunswick 
and Parkhurst the night before and that he had a gun.  
However, Smith denied that the gun belonged to him.  
Moreover, Smith claimed that he retrieved the gun in self-
defense because, although he did not know who was in the 
car, he feared for his life given that there had been a shooting 
nearby two weeks prior involving a similar car.    
 
B. The Government’s Rule 404(b) Motion  
 
 Smith, a convicted felon, was indicted on three counts: 
(1) threatening a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 111(a)(1) & (b); (2) using and possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and (3) unlawful possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
 
Before trial, the Government moved in limine to admit 
evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
that, two years prior to his arrest, Smith had engaged in a 
drug transaction on the same street corner.  The Government 
noted that the “case boils down to” Smith’s motivation in 
retrieving the gun because Smith claimed that he retrieved it 
in self-defense, and that the evidence would rebut that theory 
by establishing that Smith had a motive to assault the people 
in the vehicle.  App. 40.  Specifically, the evidence would 
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show that Smith “has a history of selling heroin on this 
corner,” which, along with evidence that “drug dealers often 
leave the guns in a stash and the drugs in a different stash” 
and that drug dealers use weapons, would prove that Smith 
wanted to assault the officers to protect “his drug turf . . . that 
particular night.”  App. 44, 46.  Smith objected, arguing that 
this line of reasoning violated Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on 
evidence about a defendant’s character, used to show his 
propensity to act in accordance with that character.  The 
District Court deferred ruling on the motion. 
 
After concluding its initial presentation of the 
evidence, the Government renewed its motion, again arguing 
that the evidence of the 2008 drug deal was necessary to show 
that Smith’s reason to assault the officers was to protect his 
turf.  The Government framed its argument as “this defendant 
was seen in the past selling drugs at that particular corner, 
which shows that he sells drugs at that corner.”  App. 212.  
Smith again objected, arguing that the evidence was 
impermissible propensity evidence. 
 
 The District Court allowed the evidence, explaining 
that it “is important to the Government in order to connect its 
proofs that there was an intentional assault.”  App. 217.  The 
Court reasoned that because “the issue that the jury ha[d] to 
resolve” was whether Smith’s motivation was “offensive, 
rather than merely defensive,” the evidence was admissible to 
determine whether Smith acted in self-defense.  App. 220.  
The Court then correctly recognized that admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence requires district courts to follow four steps, 
as set forth in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 
(1988).  Analyzing these steps, the District Court concluded 
that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose under Rule 
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404(b), i.e., “to establish motive;” that the evidence was 
relevant under Rule 402; that although the evidence was 
“significantly prejudicial” it was not “unfairly prejudicial” 
under Rule 403; and that it would give an appropriate limiting 
instruction to the jury.  App. 221-22.   
 
C. The September 2008 Incident 
 
 After this ruling, FBI Agent Michael Brooks testified 
that in September 2008 he was conducting an investigation of 
drug activity in the same corner in Newark as the one Smith 
was arrested on in 2010, when he observed Smith engaging in 
a sale of heroin.  There were no firearms involved in the 2008 
incident. 
 
 The District Court then gave a limiting instruction, 
which it repeated after its final charge, explaining that the 
testimony “was admitted for limited purposes only,” namely 
to “decid[e] whether the defendant had the intent and a 
motive to commit the acts charged.”  App. 239.  The Court 
asked the jury not to “consider this evidence as proof that the 
defendant has a bad character or any propensity to commit 
crimes.”  App. 240. 
 
D. Closing Arguments, Conviction, and 
Sentence  
 
The Government began its summation by painting 
Smith as a drug dealer with  “turf” to protect.  App. 338.  The 
prosecutor twice argued that on the night of September 2010 
Smith meant to threaten the people in the car because, even if 
the jury believed Smith’s statement that there had been a 
shooting two weeks prior, Smith wanted to menace the 
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individuals in the car for “the shoot-up of [his] turf.”  App. 
343.  In rebuttal, the Government also asked the jury to think: 
“What’s [Smith] doing standing on a corner? There is no 
house there, what’s he doing staring at a car? What’s he doing 
over there? . . . He’s been on that block before, hasn’t he? 
And not just two years ago.”  App. 365. 
 
The jury convicted Smith on all counts.  He was 
adjudicated a career offender based on the 2008 heroin sale 
that was the subject of the 404(b) motion and an unrelated 
drug possession charge, and sentenced to consecutive 
sentences of 240 months on the assault charge, 84 months on 
the use of the gun charge, and 36 months on the felon in 
possession charge, for a total of 360 months’ imprisonment. 
 
II. Analysis 
 
A. Rule 404(b) and Standard of Review 
 
 Smith argues that the District Court violated Rule 
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in admitting the 
evidence of the 2008 drug deal.1
                                              
1  The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal 
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  Rule 404(b) prohibits 
evidence of a crime “to prove a person’s character in order to 
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).  
However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another 
purpose, such as proving motive.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).  
In determining the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, a 
district court must analyze, under the familiar Huddleston 
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test, whether the evidence: (1) has a proper evidentiary 
purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) is relevant under Rule 402; 
(3) is of such probative value as to outweigh the prejudice to 
the defendant as required by Rule 403; and (4) is 
accompanied by a proper limiting instruction.  485 U.S. at 
691.  We normally review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion, but we exercise plenary review over “whether 
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).”  United 
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
B. Whether the Evidence of the 2008 Drug Sale 
Has a Proper Purpose  
To serve a proper Rule 404(b) purpose, evidence must 
be “probative of a material issue other than character.”  
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.  The Government argues that 
the evidence of Smith’s 2008 drug deal fits into Rule 404(b)’s 
exception for evidence tending to show a defendant’s motive, 
because Smith’s 2008 drug dealing shows that Smith had a 
motive to threaten individuals at the same corner in 2010: to 
protect his “turf.”  We agree that motive was relevant in this 
case and that the evidence of the 2008 drug sale tends to 
establish motive.  But that is not the end of the inquiry.   
 
To meet the first requirement for admissibility, the 
proponents of Rule 404(b) evidence must do more than 
conjure up a proper purpose—they must also establish a chain 
of inferences no link of which is based on a propensity 
inference.  United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 644 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Sampson, 980 F.2d at 886-87; see also 22 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5239, at 
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459 (1978) (“[E]vidence of other crimes can be used to prove 
the conduct of a person if the inference to conduct can be 
made without the need to infer the person’s character as a step 
in the reasoning from the other acts to the conduct in issue.”).  
As we explain below, that did not occur here. 
 
“[T]he line between what is permitted and what is 
prohibited under Rule 404(b) is sometimes quite subtle,” 
United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997), 
and “despite the recurrence of the issue[], the opinions are 
often poorly reasoned and provide little guidance to trial 
judges.”  WRIGHT & GRAHAM, § 5239 at 427.  The problem 
stems in part from two competing realities that surround most 
Rule 404(b) evidence.  On the one hand, proponents of Rule 
404(b) evidence will normally be able to conceive of a proper 
purpose other than propensity.  But if this were sufficient to 
admit the evidence, the basic idea embodied by Rule 404(b), 
that simply because one act was committed in the past does 
not mean that a like act was again committed, would be 
threatened.  On the other hand, all Rule 404(b) evidence is at 
least somewhat prejudicial to the party against whom it is 
admitted and will invite the jury to make inferences about his 
or her character.  This alone cannot lead to exclusion.  United 
States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2008).   We 
resolve this inherent tension by requiring that the purpose of 
the Rule 404(b) evidence be established without an inference 
that the party against whom it is admitted acted in conformity 
with whatever the evidence of the prior act says about his or 
her character.  We therefore do not exclude evidence simply 
if it invites character inferences, but only evidence that is 
used to prove a person’s character and that invites the 
inference that the person acted in conformity with that 
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character, and was therefore more likely to have committed 
the charged crime. 
 
The foregoing resolves this case, which presents a 
somewhat novel fact pattern.  The Government insists that the 
evidence of the 2008 drug sale does not say anything about 
Smith’s character, but simply provides his motive for the 
assault in 2010, “a continuing interest in his turf.”  Gov’t Br. 
at 30; see also id. at 31 (stating that the Government “never 
argued that Smith likely committed the charged assault 
because he previously sold drugs,” only that the “prior drug 
sale showed [Smith’s] interest in the corner”).  The problem 
with this line of reasoning is that, for the evidence of the 2008 
drug sale to speak to Smith’s motives in 2010, one must 
necessarily (a) assume something about Smith’s character 
based on the 2008 evidence (that he was then a drug dealer), 
and (b) infer that Smith acted in conformity with that 
character in 2010 by dealing drugs and therefore had a motive 
to defend his turf.  This clearly violates Rule 404(b) because 
the Government used the 2008 drug deal “to prove [Smith’s] 
character [as a drug dealer] in order to show that on a 
particular occasion [Smith] acted in accordance with th[at] 
character.”  Fed. R. Evid 404(b).2
Had Smith been observed dealing drugs on that street 
corner the morning of the incident, the Government would 
have a much stronger case, as it may have argued that the 
evidence had the proper purpose of showing a “common 
   
 
                                              
2  The Government cannot explain how or why Smith 
would have “turf” to protect if he were not a drug dealer and 
we reject the unpersuasive attempts to separate the concepts 
of “turf” and “drug dealer.” 
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scheme or plan,” see Rule 404(b)(2), or “as background 
information which completes the story of the crime,” Green, 
617 F.3d at 249.  But, “ordinarily, when courts speak of 
‘common plan or scheme,’ they are referring to a situation in 
which the charged and the uncharged crimes are parts of a 
single series of events.”  Gov’t of V.I. v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 
912, 916 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, there is no contention that the 
2008 drug deal and the 2010 crime were part of a single series 
of events.  Nor could there be.  Moreover, the temporal 
separation between the two events, the lack of similarity 
between them (in that one involved drugs and no gun and the 
other a gun and no drugs), and the isolated nature of the 2008 
drug deal, all weaken the force of the evidence standing on its 
own, to the point where the jury has to make inferences about 
Smith’s character from his 2008 conduct in order to learn 
something about Smith’s 2010 motivations from that conduct.  
See, e.g., Murray, 106 F.3d at 318 (reversing inclusion of 
evidence of a prior uncharged murder in a prosecution for a 
different murder in part because the method of the first 
murder was different than the second); United States v. 
Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing the 
admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence because there was not 
a close connection between the past drug deals and the 
charged offense). 
 
That the Government did not explicitly make a 
propensity argument does not change the outcome, 
particularly given that it did invite the jury to make the 
improper inferential leaps at summation with its explicit and 
repeated references to Smith’s “turf,” and with the rhetorical 
questions: “What’s he doing over there? . . . He’s been on that 
block before, hasn’t he? And not just two years ago.”  These 
circumstances are reminiscent of United States v. Conner, 
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where the Seventh Circuit held that evidence of a prior drug 
deal was improperly admitted because the Government 
repeatedly invited the jury to infer that the defendant had 
acted in conformity with the past conduct, noting that it “was 
not an ‘isolated incident,’ and not[ing] that the second [act] 
corroborated the first [act].”  583 F.3d 1011, 1024 (7th Cir. 
2009).  The court reasoned that “[t]he implication of the 
prosecutor’s argument was that Conner was more likely to 
have [committed the charged crime] because he had done so 
on other occasions.”  Id. at 1024-25.  See also Murray, 103 
F.3d at 320 (overturning the admission of evidence of a prior 
murder because the prosecutor had asked at closing: “Doesn’t 
[the prior murder] help establish that this defendant was part 
of this conspiracy [for the charged murder]? . . . .  [D]oesn’t 
that help establish that this defendant is . . . a killer?”).   
 
Moreover, the cases cited in the Government’s brief 
contrast sharply with, and are distinguishable from this case, 
as none involved a situation where the jury was required to 
make an assumption about the defendant’s character based on 
the past act, or to elucidate the defendant’s motive by 
assuming that the defendant acted in accordance with that 
character when committing the charged crime.  See, e.g., 
Green, 617 F.3d at 249-50 (admitting evidence that a 
defendant on trial for attempting to buy cocaine had 
threatened to kill an informant, as evidence of the informant’s 
motive to cooperate); United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739 
(3d Cir. 1996) (admitting evidence the defendant had sexually 
assaulted a kidnapping victim, as it established a motive for 
the charged kidnapping).3
                                              
3  That Smith may have invited the testimony by making 
an issue of his lack of motive to assault the officers does not 
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The Government also attempts to narrow the scope of 
Rule 404(b) by contending that the “no link” prohibition is 
limited to inferences that the defendant committed “the crime 
charged,” and posits that because the 2008 act (drug dealing) 
is not the same as the act charged (assault), no error occurred.  
Gov’t Br. at 30-31 (citing United States v. Himelwright, 42 
F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994)).  But Rule 404(b) is not so 
limited.  The problem with propensity evidence is that it 
“weigh[s] too much with the jury [because it] overpersuade[s] 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and 
den[ies] [the defendant] a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge,” without limitations based on whether the 
charged and uncharged acts are the same.  Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).  Limiting the reach 
of the Rule as the Government suggests would curtail these 
protections in a way that, to our knowledge, no court ever 
has.  See, e.g., Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 785-86 (holding that 
evidence of purchases of weapons was inadmissible in a trial 
for a different crime, making threats to postal workers). 
 
As a final argument, the Government analogizes this 
case to a hypothetical situation wherein a defendant is 
observed breaking into a vacant lot in order to live there, and 
is later prosecuted for threatening an individual who also 
attempted to enter that lot.  The Government contends that in 
                                                                                                     
eliminate the rule that no link in the chain of logical 
inferences may involve a propensity inference.  See, e.g., 
Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917 (noting that the “need to dispel an 
exculpatory [explanation] implanted by the defense . . . can 
fulfill the proper purpose requirement of Rule 404(b)” but 
excluding the evidence as a violation of the “no link” 
requirement). 
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that situation, evidence of the prior breaking and entering 
would be admissible to explain the defendant’s motive to 
threaten the would-be intruder.  But even assuming we agree 
with that legal proposition, the hypothetical only highlights 
what is different, and dispositive, about this case—the 
evidence of the prior breaking and entering does not speak to 
the defendant’s character as someone likely to make threats, 
and the motive does not hinge on an inference that he acted in 
accordance with that character.  Additionally, the breaking 
and entering evidence fairly “completes the story [of the 
crime]” without a propensity inference.  Green, 617 F.3d at 
249.  Here, however, there is no continuous, ongoing conduct 
between the 2008 and 2010 acts (that Smith was in jail for 
some of the intervening months explains but does not 
eliminate the lack of continuity between the two acts).  
Moreover, to reach the “motive” purpose from the evidence 
of the 2008 drug sale, an inference about Smith’s character 
(that he was a drug dealer) and an inference that he acted in 
conformance with that character in 2010, are required before 
the jury may determine that Smith committed the charged 
crime.  As a matter of law, then, the evidence of the 2008 
drug sale did not have a proper Rule 404(b) purpose. 
 
C. The Balancing Required By Rule 403 
 
We also conclude that the District Court’s balancing of 
the prejudicial nature of the evidence against its probative 
value warrants reversal.  To start, the District Court stated 
that the effect of the 2008 drug deal evidence was 
“significantly prejudicial” to Smith.  App. 221.  After this 
statement, however, the District Court merely said that “given 
the issues in this case, it is not unfairly prejudicial.”  App. 
222.  In light of the significantly prejudicial nature of the 
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prior acts evidence, we find this recitation of the third 
Huddleston factor insufficient.  In particular, the District 
Court did not address the diminished probative value of the 
evidence of the 2008 drug deal in light of the fact that the 
transaction did not involve firearms, or of the fact that the 
charged 2010 offense did not involve narcotics.  Thus, we 
also reverse Smith’s conviction because the District Court’s 
Rule 403 reasoning “is not apparent from the record.”  United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992).4
The Government finally contends that any error was 
harmless because: (1) Smith confessed that he retrieved the 
gun to protect himself; (2) his counsel conceded at closing 
that Smith carried the gun “in such a way as to discourage the 
occupants of the car from ‘messing’ with him”; and (3) Smith 
returned to the corner “instead of simply walking away.”  
 
 
D. The Error Was Not Harmless 
 
                                              
4  We also find unpersuasive the contention that the 
prejudicial effect of the 2008 drug sale evidence is diminished 
because the crime charged was more serious.  If that was the 
proper rubric of analysis, defendants on trial for the most 
serious crimes would be exposed to a broader universe of 
Rule 404(b) evidence than defendants on trial for mundane 
offenses, a result we cannot square with the text or purpose of 
the Rule.  United States v. Gilbert, a case which the 
Government contends supports a contrary conclusion, only 
spoke of the comparative prejudicial effect of two sets of 
proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, it did not involve weighing 
the prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence against the 
crime charged based on their relative seriousness.  229 F.3d 
15 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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Gov’t Br. at 37.  We disagree.  Smith’s counsel’s statements 
at summation are not evidence.  More importantly, evidence 
that Smith returned to the street corner rather than walking 
away and that he wanted to protect himself, while certainly 
probative of Smith’s motives, is hardly enough to convince us 
that “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to 
the judgment.”  United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 
(3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).  Indeed, the 
District Court characterized the totality of the evidence 
without the 2008 drug sale as establishing “fairly innocent . . . 
circumstances.”  App. 219.  Accordingly, the error was not 
harmless.5
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District 
Court’s admission of the evidence of the 2008 drug sale, 
vacate Smith’s conviction as to Counts 1 and 2 and his 
sentence in its entirety,
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
6 and remand the case for a new trial.7
                                              
5  Nor are we convinced that the curative instruction is 
sufficient to permit us to overlook the error.  We credit 
Smith’s contention that, had the District Court tailored the 
instruction to the specific facts of this case, it would have 
discovered that the “motive” purpose of the 2008 evidence 
was infused with improper propensity inferences. 
 
6  We vacate Smith’s sentence in its entirety so that the 
District Court may “reconstruct the sentencing architecture 
upon remand.”  United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
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7  Smith also moved to strike from the Indictment 
reference to the fact that the gun retrieved in 2010 had an 
obliterated serial number, and the District Court denied the 
motion.  We have carefully considered Smith’s arguments 
with respect to this motion on appeal, and conclude that they 
are meritless.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
evidentiary ruling with respect to that motion. 
